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An Originalist Congress?
Joel Alicea
The “pledge to america” — a compendium of campaign prom-ises released by the House Republican Conference in the run-up to 
November’s congressional elections — was not exactly full of surprises. 
More than a bold statement of conservative policy ambitions, it was a 
cautious list of familiar generalities. But buried deep within the 45-page 
document appeared this curious promise: “We will require each bill 
moving through Congress to include a clause citing the specific consti-
tutional authority upon which the bill is justified.”
At first, the proposal might seem superfluous. Doesn’t Congress al-
ready consider its constitutional authority when making laws? The 
answer, sadly, is all too often no. In fact, lawmakers frequently go out 
of their way to avoid considering the constitutionality of the bills they 
aim to enact — preferring to push their legislation through first, and leave 
it to the Supreme Court to decide later whether the contents pass consti-
tutional muster. Sometimes, laws are even carefully crafted with litigation 
in mind: Justifications and findings written into the text of the legislation 
are drafted not to resonate with the language of the Constitution, but 
rather with the language of judicial opinions articulating what the Court 
has said the Constitution means.
A recent example of this phenomenon is the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act enacted last March, and particularly its “individual 
mandate” requiring every American to carry health insurance approved 
by the federal government. From the outset, there were serious con-
cerns about the constitutionality of the government’s forcing Americans 
to buy a particular product. And yet, when asked whether these objec-
tions had any validity, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi dismissed them as 
“ nonsensical” — saying “the power of Congress to regulate health care is 
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essentially unlimited.” Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid took a more 
subtle approach; the version of the bill he sponsored made sure to reference 
the kind of language the Supreme Court has employed in various deci-
sions justifying expansive federal regulation under the commerce clause. 
As Gene Healy (a vice president of the Cato Institute) noted, the “findings” 
section of Reid’s bill “[hit] all the jurisprudential buzzwords: The individual 
mandate ‘substantially affects interstate commerce,’ and regulates ‘activity 
that is commercial and economic in nature.’ ” To Healy, this approach to 
legislating — crafting laws with judges, not the text of the Constitution, 
in mind — represented a perilous neglect of congressional responsibility. 
“Members of Congress swear an oath to uphold the Constitution,” Healy 
wrote, “not the court’s funhouse-mirror version of it.”
In principle, then, the Republicans’ pledge could do a great deal of 
good, by refocusing Congress’s attention where it belongs: on the docu-
ment from which Congress, and the rest of our government, draw their 
legitimate authority. But what would the constitutional-citation provi-
sion mean in practice? Members of Congress could cite any constitutional 
provision they wished in support of their bills, and the citations would 
carry little weight. Legislators, like many of today’s judges, could impose 
meanings on the Constitution foreign to its history and purpose.
What Congress needs as a companion to its constitutionality pledge 
is a theoretically coherent and legitimate method of constitutional 
 analysis. Legislators of a more conservative bent — including many mem-
bers of the new Republican House majority — might be most inclined 
to turn to “originalism”: the notion that the Constitution’s  interpreters 
should adhere to the meaning of the text as understood by the men 
who enacted it. Depending on one’s particular brand of originalism, the 
understanding that matters belongs to either the framers of the docu-
ment or the people who ratified it; the key point, however, is that an 
 originalist refuses to substitute his own views on what the Constitution 
should mean for how the document was originally understood.
But adopting an originalist approach to congressional constitutional in-
terpretation is no simple matter, because conventional wisdom (even among 
many originalists) places the authority to determine the Constitution’s 
meaning solidly in the hands of the courts, not the legislature. Members of 
Congress who would claim to be originalists will first need to decide what 
exactly that means in a legislative context — and whether Congress ought 
to assert itself as a constitutional interpreter in its own right.
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judicial supremacy
It is worth asking first whether Congress ought to play a major role in 
interpreting the Constitution at all. Here, “major” is the operative word; 
of course Congress does some interpreting of the Constitution all the time. 
As Jack Balkin of Yale Law School notes, “every Congressional enactment 
passed under the commerce power, and every appropriation under the 
General Welfare Clause, involves an implicit interpretation of these clauses, 
whether or not any court ever considers them.” The real issue is whether 
Congress’s constitutional interpretation should be seen as  carrying roughly 
equal authority as that of the Supreme Court, or whether we ought to think 
of the Court as having the final word on the Constitution’s  meaning. After 
all, if the Court is the final arbiter — and therefore the only  meaningful 
arbiter — of the document, then why should Congress even bother to con-
sider the Constitution while making law?
That question has been raised in recent months by several critics of 
the House Republicans’ pledge document. Dahlia Lithwick, legal-affairs 
 correspondent for the popular liberal web site Slate, wrote of one candi-
date’s reference to the pledge commitment: “How weird is that, I thought. 
Isn’t it a court’s job to determine whether or not something is, in fact, con-
stitutional? And isn’t that sort of provided for in, well, the Constitution?”
The Constitution, of course, says nothing of the sort. But better 
informed and less snide readers of the pledge might nonetheless have 
been similarly perplexed, given the Court’s repeated declarations of its 
ultimate authority to determine the Constitution’s meaning. After all, 
it was Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in the 1803 case Marbury 
v. Madison that famously asserted: “It is emphatically the duty of the 
Judicial Department to say what the law is.”
Most contemporary legal scholars would no doubt argue that the 
Court does have the last word on the Constitution’s meaning — a doc-
trine known as judicial supremacy. But this has not always been the 
consensus view, and it is hardly self-evident. The meaning of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s statement in Marbury is open to debate, and the  notion that 
his opinion in that case endorses the idea of judicial supremacy has been 
disputed by scholars, perhaps most forcefully by Stanford Law School 
dean Larry Kramer in his book The People Themselves.
Indeed, our constitutional history is punctuated by episodes in 
which the other branches of the federal government — especially the 
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executive branch — refused to go along with the notion that the Court 
alone is entitled to interpret the meaning of the Constitution. Of these, 
the best-known example is Abraham Lincoln’s renunciation of judicial 
supremacy in his first inaugural address. Responding to the Court’s 1857 
Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, Lincoln said:
The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the govern-
ment upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant 
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal 
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, 
to that extent, practically resigned their government into the hands 
of that eminent tribunal.
As president, Lincoln resisted the Court’s authority not only in theory 
but also in practice. He deliberately flouted the justices’ ruling when he 
ordered the State Department to issue passports to blacks, something 
foreclosed by the Court when it expressly denied blacks citizenship sta-
tus in the Dred Scott opinion.
Of course, Lincoln was not the only executive to go toe-to-toe with 
the Court over the power to interpret the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson 
also insisted on the independent authority of the president and Congress 
to assess the meaning of the document. In an 1819 letter, he argued:
If this opinion [i.e., the doctrine of judicial supremacy] be sound, 
then indeed is our Constitution a complete felo de se [act of 
 suicide]. For intending to establish three departments, coordinate 
and  independent, that they might check and balance one another, 
it has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone the 
right to prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to 
that one, too, which is unelected by and independent of the nation.
When President Andrew Jackson vetoed Congress’s re-chartering of the 
Second Bank of the United States on the grounds that the charter was 
unconstitutional, he did so despite the fact that the charter had been 
upheld by the Court in the 1819 case McCulloch v. Maryland. Jackson’s 
famous veto message to Congress was an emphatic denial of the judi-
ciary’s exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution. “Each public 
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officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will 
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others,” 
Jackson argued. Since then, other presidents — from Franklin Roosevelt 
to Ronald Reagan — have now and then expressed, in word and deed, 
an aversion to letting the judiciary alone determine exactly what the 
Constitution does and does not allow.
Overall, however, such challenges to the Court’s authority from the 
elected branches have been few and inconsistent, and most presidents 
and members of Congress have been more than happy to defer to judi-
cial authority. One reason, as Princeton University’s Keith Whittington 
points out in his book Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, is that 
it is politically advantageous for the popular branches to avoid inserting 
themselves into the messy and controversial morass of constitutional 
interpretation. Rather than anger one constituency or another, they gen-
erally prefer instead to let the Court decide.
The best example of this approach may well be President George W. 
Bush’s decision in 2002 to sign the McCain-Feingold bill, which imposed 
severe restrictions on political campaign donations and expenditures. 
Even as he signed the bill, Bush stated that he believed several sections 
to be unconstitutional. And yet he said he would sign the legislation 
anyway — because, as he put it, “I expect that the courts will resolve 
these legitimate legal questions as appropriate under the law.”
This shirking of constitutional responsibility by presidents and legis-
lators has helped the Court cement its claim to being the sole interpreter 
of the Constitution. And that claim was further strengthened by the 
crisis that arose in the aftermath of the Court’s decision in the 1954 
case Brown v. Board of Education, which was met with vehement oppo-
sition and defiance in the state of Arkansas. In the 1958 case of Cooper 
v. Aaron, the Court ruled that Arkansas was obligated to comply with 
the decision in Brown, citing the supremacy clause of Article VI of the 
Constitution, which declares federal law supreme over state law. This 
would have been a sufficient justification for the Court’s decision, but 
the justices went further and interpreted Marbury as conferring ultimate 
constitutional authority on the Court: “This decision declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected 
by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable fea-
ture of our constitutional system.”
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Of course, as noted above, whether Marbury made such a declaration 
is a highly debatable question, and even a casual glance at the history 
of judicial supremacy undermines the Court’s claim that this doctrine 
has been a “permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system.” But given the crisis atmosphere surrounding the Cooper 
 decision — and given the need to present a united front against the vio-
lence and bigotry of  segregationists — this bold assertion of power was 
not seriously contested.
As the Warren and Burger Courts began issuing increasingly con-
troversial decisions, however, the implications of judicial supremacy 
over constitutional interpretation came into sharper relief, and the de-
bate over the role of extrajudicial actors in interpretation was joined. 
Constitution scholar Donald Morgan, for instance, argued in his 1966 
book Congress and the Constitution that Congress ought to resist a 
“ judicial monopoly” over constitutional interpretation, given the firm 
historical basis for a congressional role in that enterprise. Morgan saw 
policy and constitutional questions as closely interconnected, and he 
wrote of the need for Congress to adopt a legislative framework incor-
porating both aspects of lawmaking.
Perhaps the most significant scholarship in this area in recent years has 
come from Mark Tushnet, Jeremy Waldron, and Larry Kramer, of Harvard, 
New York University, and Stanford law schools, respectively. Tushnet and 
Waldron, in different books, argue against the very idea of judicial review. 
Taking an approach rooted in jurisprudence and political theory, both 
scholars contend that the political branches should be the  ultimate arbiters 
of constitutional meaning, though Waldron’s argument is more focused 
on the British constitutional system. This radical assault on the idea of 
 judicial supremacy is less evident in the work of Kramer, who argues for 
the historical basis of what he calls “popular  constitutionalism,” a theory 
that attempts to marry judicial review (though not judicial  supremacy) 
with vigorous popular participation in constitutional  decisions. Like 
Tushnet, Waldron, and Morgan, then, Kramer argues for an  expanded 
role for Congress in constitutional interpretation.
This debate over Congress’s proper role in interpreting the 
Constitution has manifested itself politically as well, most recently in 
the clash over the constitutionality of Obamacare’s individual insurance 
mandate. As noted above, Nancy Pelosi provided a pitch-perfect example 
of the dominant view that Congress has little to say about constitutional 
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interpretation. When asked by a journalist if the individual mandate 
was constitutional, she shot back in exasperation, “Are you serious?” 
The idea that Congress ought to think carefully about the constitution-
ality of legislation, rather than deferring to the courts, seemed alien to 
America’s highest-ranking legislator.
But it turns out that some Americans today take this notion quite seri-
ously. A conservative revival, taking form most prominently in the Tea 
Party movement, has urged a return to constitutional principles by all 
levels and branches of government. Conservative talk-radio stations have 
suddenly been flooded with ads for institutions offering to teach citizens 
about the Constitution and the founding era — so that they, not judges, 
might decide what the document does and does not say. In its September 
profile of Glenn Beck, the New York Times Magazine described the intense 
fervor with which conservatives are speaking of the Constitution and the 
wisdom of the founders, particularly at Beck’s rallies and appearances. 
And, then, of course, came the House Republicans’ commitment to cite 
constitutional authority for any bill they enact.
The new House majority, then, seems inclined against the notion of 
judicial supremacy that has been so prominent in American political life 
for half a century. They believe that members of Congress — the duly 
elected representatives of the people — should play a significant role in 
interpreting the Constitution’s meaning.
It is not enough, however, to simply assert the right of the legislature 
and the executive to interpret the Constitution. Nor is it enough for 
Congress to say it will no longer abdicate to the courts the responsibility to 
determine whether the legislation it enacts is or is not constitutional. For 
a renewed claim to interpretive authority to have any weight, Congress 
must demonstrate, in some credible way, that it takes the Constitution 
seriously when it legislates. Such an undertaking requires a theory of con-
stitutional interpretation. Having decided that they should play a role in 
interpreting the Constitution, members of Congress must now decide 
how they will do so.
a Novel origiNalism
For conservatives, one would think the answer would be obvious. 
Thanks to paragons of the conservative judiciary like Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Judge Robert Bork, originalism has long been the right’s pre-
ferred approach to constitutional interpretation. But should originalism 
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be adopted by Congress? And what would it look like as a method of 
congressional constitutional interpretation?
Relatively little effort has been made to answer these questions — in 
part because the modern conception of originalism is a far more novel 
idea than its champions suggest. While Justice Scalia is fond of saying that 
originalism was the orthodox judicial approach to interpretation from the 
founding until the early 20th century, its true history is more complex. 
As Georgia Southern University history professor Johnathan O’Neill has 
chronicled in his book Originalism in American Law and Politics, the 18th- 
and 19th-century version of originalism that Justice Scalia cites was in fact 
quite distinct from modern strains of the theory.
Originalism in the founding era was heavily influenced by the thought 
of the 18th-century English jurist William Blackstone. As Harvard law pro-
fessor Mary Ann Glendon has argued, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England served as “the law book in the United States in the crucial 
years immediately preceding and following the American Revolution”; 
its dominance continued throughout much of the 19th century. Moreover, 
O’Neill identifies the “canons of interpretation” elucidated by Blackstone 
in the Commentaries as being the primary lens through which American 
lawyers viewed the Constitution prior to the 20th century. Those 
 canons — rules to guide interpreters in their task — aimed to ascertain 
the intent of the lawgiver, using the text of the law as the principal means 
of discovering that intent. Words were given their everyday meanings, 
and evidence extrinsic to the text was considered, at most, of secondary 
 importance. Thus, the records of debates surrounding the passage of a par-
ticular law — what is commonly referred to as “legislative  history” — were 
only marginally relevant.
These rules had profound implications for the development of origi-
nalism during this period. Originalism, following the Blackstonian 
canons, focused on the intent of the Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers 
as revealed by the text. Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, which addressed the state’s tax on notes of the Second Bank 
of the United States, provides a good example of this approach. The case 
raised the issue of the elasticity of the Constitution’s necessary and proper 
clause (located in Article I’s enumeration of congressional powers, and 
giving Congress the authority to make laws needed to exercise the pow-
ers that the Constitution grants to the U.S. government). The chief justice 
compared the use of the word “necessary” in this clause to its use in other 
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parts of the document, in addition to discussing its usage in everyday life. 
As described by O’Neill, this form of originalism, with a focus on text and 
intent, was common throughout the 19th century.
What we think of as originalism today, however, is quite different. Its 
beginnings are usually traced to Judge Bork’s seminal 1971 Indiana Law 
Review article, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems.” 
As it has developed since then, modern originalism has proven far more 
heterogeneous than the Blackstonian version. There is no consensus that 
the original intent is what is sought. While some originalists continue to 
search for intent, others restrict their inquiries to the meanings of the 
words as they were understood in the founding era, and still others prefer 
to know how the founding generation should have understood the words 
given the linguistic conventions of the time. And even where judicial origi-
nalists have agreed that their task is discovering the Constitution’s original 
intent, there is fierce debate over whose intent  matters: the  framers’, the 
ratifying conventions’, or the general public’s?
This dizzying array of differences in interpretation leads to differences 
in methodology. Some originalists look to the debates of the Constitutional 
Convention to understand the meaning of the final document, while oth-
ers emphasize the newspapers and dictionaries of the relevant period. 
Originalism today thus relies a great deal on evidence extrinsic to the text. 
It has become, in this sense, much more of a historian’s art than that of a 
Blackstonian lawyer.
Modern originalism has, moreover, focused almost exclusively on the 
judiciary. As constitutional-law scholar Gary Leedes once noted, origi-
nalists “permit the electorally accountable officials substantial leeway. 
The Congress can interpret the tenth amendment and the necessary 
and proper clause virtually as it pleases”; what matters in the end is not 
what Congress legislates, but rather what the Supreme Court decides 
Congress is allowed to legislate.
The reason for the attention paid to the courts is straightforward: 
They were the raison d’être of modern originalism. Judge Bork’s article 
was written in response to decisions emanating from the Warren Court 
of the 1950s and ’60s, and he was quickly joined by Justice William 
Rehnquist and Harvard professor Raoul Berger in developing original-
ism’s modern form. All three wrote at a time when originalist theory was 
seen as an emerging alternative to the judicial philosophies of the Warren 
and Burger Courts, which handed down decisions — including Griswold 
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v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade — based on constitutional interpretations 
that many legal scholars saw as complete fabrications. As a result, whereas 
the text-centered originalism of the 18th and 19th centuries was employed 
across all three branches of government, modern originalism was created 
almost exclusively to serve as an alternative judicial philosophy.
Modern originalism, then, has been around for only four decades 
or so, and has concerned itself almost exclusively with the courts — to 
the point that it might even seem to imply that Congress need not 
abide by an originalist understanding of the Constitution as long as 
the courts do. It is therefore no surprise that scholars — not to mention 
lawmakers — have largely ignored the implications of originalism for 
congressional constitutional interpretation.
three str aNds of origiNalism
So what can we say about applying originalism to Congress? First, we 
should distinguish between pragmatic and theoretical justifications for 
legislative originalism. A pragmatic justification would consider the re-
sults one could expect from an originalist legislature — its demonstrable 
effects on a range of policies. Being more attuned to results, this ap-
proach would ask whether an originalist Congress would be obligated 
to dispense with, say, the Social Security program, on the grounds that 
the Constitution does not grant Congress the power to create such a 
program, and whether this outcome would be desirable. Appealing as 
this approach might initially seem, however, it is deeply flawed: Aside 
from the fact that it has no roots in any real principle, it would require 
us to consider innumerable policy discussions and outcomes — and so 
to predict an inherently unpredictable political process.
We would do better, therefore, to pursue an approach more grounded 
in theory. Such an approach might begin by flipping the question of 
whether Congress should adopt originalism and looking at whether origi-
nalism should adopt Congress — that is, whether originalism, as a theory 
of interpretation, logically requires that Congress be originalist.
To answer that question, it is useful to identify three different schools 
of originalism in contemporary legal thought. One might be called 
“ institutional originalism,” because it justifies originalism by virtue of the 
roles played by various institutions within the constitutional scheme. The 
most prominent exponent of this approach is Judge Bork, who lays out 
a notion of originalism that, while accepting the Supreme Court’s claim 
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to dominance in constitutional interpretation, would limit the Court’s 
discretion and allow for greater deference to legislative enactments. Bork 
articulates this originalist theory well in The Tempting of America, while 
discussing what he terms “the Madisonian Dilemma.” The dilemma, 
in Bork’s view, is that the Supreme Court — having the final word on 
constitutional interpretation — is forced to strike a Madisonian balance 
between majority rule and minority rights. If the Court tilts too much 
in one direction or the other, it risks either a tyranny of the majority 
(in which minorities have little legal protection from majority will) or a 
tyranny of the minority (in which a minority of the population dictates 
national policy through the courts). In his Indiana Law Review article, 
Judge Bork said of the dilemma: “[It] imposes severe requirements upon 
the Court. For it follows that the Court’s power is legitimate only if it 
has . . . a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective 
spheres of majority and minority freedom.” For Bork, that “valid theory” 
is originalism — because it ostensibly provides a neutral way of defining 
the “spheres of majority and minority freedom.”
Institutional originalism therefore uses originalist theory as a means 
to an end. Its goal is a proper relationship among the various branches of 
government, and originalism is the most legitimate way to achieve that 
balance. The reason institutional originalists focus almost exclusively 
on the Supreme Court is that they concede the reality that, in today’s 
political and legal culture, judicial supremacy is widely accepted. They 
therefore see a pressing need for judicial originalism, lest the courts, 
riding this supremacy, make up constitutional meaning out of whole 
cloth. Questions of congressional originalism are thus largely ignored, 
because legislation will ultimately undergo judicial review anyway; at 
that moment, an originalist judiciary can correct any legislative errors. 
There is no similar institutional check on the Court itself.
There are two major problems with the institutional originalists’ 
view of legislative originalism. The first is the assumption, historical 
or  practical, that judicial supremacy corrects for any legislative enact-
ments of dubious constitutionality. From a historical perspective, we 
have already seen that the idea of judicial supremacy has been contested 
throughout most of our history; it therefore seems wrong to assume 
that the current consensus in favor of judicial supremacy will endure 
indefinitely. The long-running debate about the Court’s authority over 
interpretation is far from over.
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More important, it is simply not true that the Court is able or willing 
to correct all of Congress’s unconstitutional actions. There are both doctri-
nal and constitutional reasons why the Court might never pass judgment 
on a particular legislative act. The political question doctrine, developed 
over many years by the Court, relegates certain questions to the political 
branches, and the justices are loath to insert themselves into these issues. 
The 1993 case Nixon v. United States, in which a federal judge challenged 
the constitutionality of his removal from office by the Senate, is a per-
fect example. The Supreme Court refused to rule on the constitutionality 
of Judge Nixon’s removal because the Constitution vests the Senate with 
exclusive authority over removing impeached judges from office. Even if 
Congress were to act in a way that appeared inconsistent with the impeach-
ment and removal procedures outlined in Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of the 
Constitution, it is unlikely the Court would intervene.
The same is true with regard to “standing,” a procedural hurdle 
 mandated by Article III, Section 2, that must be cleared before the merits 
of a constitutional case can be decided by a federal court. The thresh-
old for estab lishing standing to sue was articulated by Justice Scalia 
in his majority opinion in the 1992 case Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife — in 
which environmental activists argued that they could sue the U.S. gov-
ernment for harm it caused endangered species in foreign countries, 
because these activists might someday want to travel to observe those 
species (and thus were  being harmed themselves). The Court’s majority, 
 however,  disagreed. Scalia contended that the “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of  standing” contained three elements — the first being 
“ injury in fact,” described as “an invasion of a legally protected interest” 
that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” (instead 
of merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical”). The second was a “causal 
 connection” between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct; 
the third was that it had to be “ ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable [court] decision.’ ” These 
criteria for standing would make it almost impossible for many congres-
sional enactments to be effectively challenged on constitutional grounds. 
After all, when the only directly injured party is the Constitution, who 
under this rubric would have standing to sue?
It is clear, then, that placing total trust in a sympathetic Supreme 
Court to remedy unconstitutional congressional actions is a foolish un-
dertaking for any originalist. If one thinks that originalism provides the 
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best means of ensuring a proper balance of power among the branches, 
then it only makes sense to advocate an originalist Congress as well.
Moreover, if institutional originalists seek a Court that is restrained 
in its actions and that is deferential to legislative enactments, while 
simul taneously allowing the legislature to be decidedly non- originalist, 
then the result will inevitably be non-originalist laws upheld by a 
 restrained, originalist Court. The argument for judicial restraint works 
only if the legislature lives up to its end of the bargain. By their own 
logic, institutional originalists like Judge Bork ought to champion leg-
islative originalism, too.
The second category of originalists can be termed “interpretation 
originalists.” They see originalism as the only correct way of interpreting 
the Constitution, and often they go further in claiming that the original 
intent of the author is the only way to legitimately interpret other kinds 
of documents, from the legal to the literary. This brand of originalism 
is concerned with implementing originalism for its own sake, not as a 
means to an end. It pays little attention to institutional dynamics, be-
cause it simply sees any form of non-originalism as an incorrect way of 
interpreting the Constitution. This category includes many prominent 
originalists past and present, with University of Virginia law professor 
Saikrishna Prakash and University of San Diego law professor Lawrence 
Alexander being notable current examples. Prakash has summed up 
this view neatly: “Indeed, any text or utterance, legal or not, should be 
understood through the originalist lens.”
Here, the case for legislative originalism is straightforward. If origi-
nalism is the correct way of interpreting the Constitution, then how 
can it be correct only when it is the judiciary that is doing the inter-
preting? Interpretation originalists make a very strong claim about the 
nature of interpretation, and that nature ought to apply across contexts. 
The interpretation originalists cannot appeal to the different roles that 
Congress and the Court play, or to any other set of extrinsic factors. 
Theirs is a theory that admits of no wiggle room: Either an interpreter 
is performing his task properly by using originalist methods, or he is, as 
an objective matter, misinterpreting the text.
Finally, there is a third category of originalists who argue for original-
ism for other reasons, such as those who do so on the basis of popular 
sovereignty. This is the idea that, because the Constitution was ratified by 
the people, and because the preamble of the Constitution implies that the 
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people are the ultimate sovereign, the judiciary is bound to interpret the 
text with the people’s intentions in mind. Keith Whittington articulates 
this rationale in his book Constitutional Interpretation, and it is a justifi-
cation that has real currency among originalists. In fact, University of 
Illinois law professor Kurt Lash recently called popular sovereignty “the 
most common (and most influential) justification for originalism.”
This approach comes closest to offering a real case against legislative 
originalism. Champions of popular-sovereignty originalism argue that 
judges, as mere agents of the people’s will, are not authorized to alter the 
charter expressing that will. Their job, as judges, is simply to interpret 
the will of the people, remaining in a subordinate capacity to the popular 
sovereign. But Congress, because it is supposed to represent the current 
will of the people, would seem to have far greater authority to depart from 
the original intent of the Constitution — which, after all, expresses the 
public will as it stood many years ago. Here the dispute might seem to 
come down to whose will is authoritative: that of the people who ratified 
the Constitution, or that of today’s electorate as represented in Congress?
It is important for a popular-sovereignty originalist to tread carefully 
here. If an originalist concedes that any Congress, channeling the will of 
the people at that moment, may alter the meaning of the Constitution 
through ordinary legislation, then he has effectively committed meth-
odological suicide. The popular-sovereignty originalist cannot demand 
that the Supreme Court adhere to the will of the people of the late 1780s 
while simultaneously holding that, through the mechanism of congres-
sional action, the will of today’s electorate supersedes the authority of the 
Constitution as originally drafted and ratified. If both were right, what justi-
fication would the Supreme Court have for striking down a congressionally 
enacted law on originalist grounds? Clearly, if the will of today’s electorate 
is supreme, then whatever Congress does is constitutionally legitimate; it 
would thus be a usurpation of authority for the Court to invalidate a con-
gressional enactment by appealing to the Constitution’s original meaning. 
Either the will of the people of the 1780s is binding on all branches of gov-
ernment, or it is binding on no branch of government. The logic of popular 
sovereignty allows for no middle ground. If popular-sovereignty originalists 
are judicial originalists, they must be congressional originalists, too.
It would appear, then, that the internal logic of modern originalism — in 
all of its major forms — requires an originalist Congress. Under the origi-
nalist view, every time Congress levies a new tax, creates a new program, or 
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imposes a new regulatory requirement, it first needs to consult the original 
meaning of the Constitution’s relevant provisions to determine whether 
Congress in fact has the authority to enact the proposed law. Were mem-
bers of Congress to pass that particular buck to the Supreme Court, they 
would be committing a serious dereliction of duty.
This is a necessary conclusion of originalist theory, albeit one that 
most scholars and public officials have thus far failed to act upon. If 
the Republican majority is serious about its pledge — and is looking for 
a method of constitutional interpretation to use in implementing that 
pledge — it will find a ready instrument in originalism: a theory that 
demands precisely the approach to congressional constitutional interpre-
tation that the Republican promise proposes.
legislative origiNalism iN pr actice
What would this mean for the everyday work of the Congress? One con-
cern about legislative originalism involves the question of whether such 
an approach would require the Congress to undo major policies and pro-
grams — for instance, the Social Security program — with constitutional 
foundations that are deemed questionable by some originalists. Would 
legislative originalism respect legislative precedent?
The question of whether originalism in any form is reconcilable 
with precedent has long divided originalists. Many noteworthy origi-
nalists emphatically answer no, including prominent theorists like 
University of St. Thomas law professor Michael Stokes Paulsen. But 
many  others —  including, most notably, Justice Scalia — have attempted 
to make the marriage between originalism and precedent work. If 
Congress chose to accept this form of originalism, which it undoubt-
edly would, then there is no reason to think it could not keep many 
of the programs and policies that have become well-accepted parts of 
the constitutional framework, including Social Security. The real work 
would be in devising criteria for deciding which precedents are accept-
able and which ones must be thrown out, a task that remains unresolved 
even within originalist scholarship relating to the courts.
Members of Congress will no doubt pursue that effort in a variety 
of informal ways, informed by their different understandings of their 
constitutional responsibilities. Indeed, the application of originalism 
to the work of the Congress more generally will by necessity be some-
what  informal. The proposal in the Republican pledge document is 
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non-binding; presumably, it would involve a bill’s sponsor simply citing 
the provision of the Constitution that he believes justifies the action that 
his bill proposes to take. That citation could then be criticized or debated, 
sparking an argument about the meaning of the Constitution — an argu-
ment from which the Congress could surely benefit, and in which the 
original intent of the document would play an important role.
It would not be easy to make such a process more formal, as any 
means of doing so would involve both procedural and substantive risks. 
Congress could, for instance, create in each house a permanent commit-
tee charged with scrutinizing the constitutionality of all legislation. If the 
committee deemed a bill constitutional, it would report the legislation 
out of  committee; otherwise, the bill would die. But while this method 
would yield robust constitutional oversight, it would also produce a pro-
cedural nightmare for both the committee and the entire Congress. And 
of course, the committee’s approach to the Constitution would depend 
on which party controlled the Congress, and therefore the majority of 
the committee.
Congress could even create some sort of advisory agency — on the 
model of the Government Accountability Office, perhaps — with the sole 
task of examining the constitutionality of proposed legislation. Bills 
would be referred to this office in much the same way legislation is pre-
sented to the Congressional Budget Office for cost estimates before being 
voted on; the agency’s reports on proposed laws would be made available 
to Congress and the public. The advantage of this agency model is that it 
would allow for a less fragmented legislative process than under the com-
mittee proposal. And because of the public disclosure and transparency, 
Congress could still approve legislation even if the office found that a bill 
was, in all likelihood, unconstitutional. The wisdom of such a decision 
would ultimately be determined by an informed electorate in the next 
voting cycle. Of course, a major problem with this sort of agency is that 
it could easily be exploited to advance political agendas that have nothing 
to do with interpreting the Constitution.
In practice, then, the process of congressional interpretation of the 
Constitution envisioned by the new House Republican majority is 
likely to remain fairly unstructured — a matter of individual members, 
or groups of members, who gather together to sponsor a bill offering 
their colleagues and the broader public a sense of why they believe the 
action they propose would be permissible under the powers delegated 
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to Congress by the Constitution. Members could make simple or soph-
isticated arguments, could refer to judicial precedent or to the plain 
language of the Constitution, and could explain their method of analysis 
and interpretation even as they articulate the intent of their legislation. 
Such a process, and the debates it would spark, would be very good 
for the Congress, the voting public, and our constitutional system. It 
would also remind the nation (including the federal judiciary) that the 
Constitution belongs to everyone — and that the branches of govern-
ment are co-equal in their obligations to the Constitution.
Admittedly, all of this may seem a touch absurd. How could we pos-
sibly expect that Congress would ever bind itself to originalism, and thus 
impose significant constraints upon its own power, when there is no polit-
ical incentive to do so? In the past few months, though, we have seen that 
a political movement can coalesce around a vision of the Constitution — a 
vision closely tied to originalism. Conservative activists have taken the is-
sue of constitutional interpretation seriously, and, at least for the moment, 
politicians ignore the issue at their own electoral peril. Why not make the 
most of this moment, and establish some rules and practices that future 
Congresses would find politically difficult to reverse? Why not force all 
newly proposed legislation to pass at least some constitutional muster? 
Americans are clearly hungry for a new vision of governance — why not 
start by taking the Constitution seriously?
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